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ABSTRACT: There is a vast literature on evidence-based practice (EBP) in education. Both critics of and 
adherents to EBP seem to think of evidence largely as quantitative data, serving as a foundation from which 
practice could and should be derived; in Toulminian terms, evidence is treated solely as data/grounds. I 
argue in this paper that it is better in educational reasoning to view the function of evidence as backing of 
the warrant. 
KEYWORDS: Backing, data, EBP, education, evidence, judgment, reasoning, rules, Toulmin model, warrant. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There exists a vast and growing literature on evidence-based practice (hereafter EBP) in edu-
cation; hardly surprising given the status of “evidence-based” as a buzzword in contemporary 
educational debates (and also in e.g. medicine, military leadership and policy-making). In 
education EBP largely seems to have arisen as a government wish for better research bases to 
inform policy and practice; this has become known as the what works agenda.  
 It is not easy to characterize the EBP debate. It branches off in several direc-
tions, and it is also to some extent plagued by general unclarity, confusions and misun-
derstandings. But to a good many of the participants in the debate there is obviously 
something very provoking about EBP. I think that some of the criticisms of the current 
educational “landscape” hit EBP by contagion, so to speak. This landscape is dominated 
by a vocabulary consisting of concepts and ideas such as learning outcomes, testing, 
measurement, qualification, employability, accountability, effectiveness, competencies 
and predictability; here given in no particular order. Since schooling and education are 
considered successful when predetermined outcomes have been achieved, education 
makes excessive requirements of assessment, measurement and documentation. EBP is 
generally seen as belonging in this picture; to know what works in order to maximize the 
probability of attaining the goal. The critics claim that all these concepts taken together 
make for a very narrow and highly instrumental conception of education. 
 This criticism of the big picture of contemporary education is, to my mind, both 
pertinent and justified. But it cannot automatically be assumed that it thereby applies to 
EBP as well; EBP in itself is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce the educational 
landscape outlined above. When we single out EBP for special attention, two things stand 
out. First, the abundance of misunderstandings and confusions concerning the term evi-
dence; and second, the absence of fruitful discussions about the possible uses or roles of 
research evidence in practice. In this paper I shall discuss the second issue, focusing on 
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how research evidence can enter into practitioners’ deliberations and decisions – not on 
what teachers might do in their classrooms. I propose to employ Toulmin’s model of ar-
guments to discuss the role that research evidence can play in practice, and the role I shall 
advocate deviates substantially from the role ascribed to it by most writers. First I shall 
look into certain aspects of the EBP debate relevant to my issue; then I use Toulmin’s 
model of argumentation to argue for what I take to be a more adequate role for evidence 
than the one that can be identified in the literature.  
2. A SKETCH OF THE EDUCATIONAL EBP DEBATE 
The EBP debate in education has a rather adversarial character. There are adherents and 
there are critics, and (at least until recently) the critics far outnumber the adherents. One 
thing both camps agree about, is that EBP from the beginning has had strong political 
overtones in the form of government wishes to improve the results of the educational 
system. This is of course a legitimate government concern. By extension, it is equally 
legitimate for governments to be concerned with how the desired results are best 
achieved; that is, to ask for knowledge of what works. The disagreements among other 
things pertain to what kind of results one wants. To know if your strategy works you must 
be able to measure its outcomes, and there is then the risk that desired results become 
identical to outcomes that actually are measurable. Critics argue that this is misguided 
because it narrows education to training and instruction and fails to do justice to broader 
cognitive processes such as e.g. rational reflection and appreciation of art. I think the crit-
ics have a very good point here; all educationists have good reason to worry about the 
thorough-going instrumentalization of even higher education that we see today. But these 
particular worries mainly concern the objectives of education and our understanding of 
what education is all about, and in this paper I am going to be concerned with the possi-
ble roles of research evidence in the deliberations of practitioners. 
 The kick-off for the debate was David Hargreaves’ now (in)famous TTA lecture 
in 1996 (The Teacher Training Agency of Great Britain). Through a comparison with 
medicine he argues that teaching is not a research-based profession; that a radical change 
in the kind of research done is needed, and that the organization of research must be 
changed accordingly. Educational research, Hargreaves insists, should serve to improve 
practice. This requires research which, 
[...] (i) demonstrates conclusively that if teachers change their practice from x to y there will be 
a significant and enduring improvement in teaching and learning and (ii) has developed an ef-
fective method of convincing teachers of the benefits of, and means to, changing from x to y 
(Hargreaves 1996a: 5). 
This will naturally, he thinks, lead to a dramatic increase in evidence-based research, and 
most of this will be quantitative evidence gathered using randomized controlled trials (RCT).  
 Hargreaves is one of very few educational researchers I have come across who is 
enthusiastically in favor of EBP, although he is not completely alone. It is a constant 
theme for him that educational research should improve the performativity of teachers 
with respect to outcomes; outcomes generally perceived as measurable outputs. For this 
reason, he is a strong advocate of research into practical issues. To gather evidence about 
what works in what circumstances is the whole point of evidence-based research, he 
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maintains (1996b). This kind of research is useful for policy-makers, school developers, 
headmasters and teachers and could thus have a direct impact on practice. Teachers, Har-
greaves states, want to know what works – only secondarily are they interested in under-
standing the why of classroom events.  
 Virtually every aspect of Hargreaves’ views has been attacked. He has become, I 
think, so closely associated with EBP that criticism of his views is seen as tantamount to 
criticism of EBP. His comparison of education to medicine is found wanting (e.g. Ham-
mersley 1997, Norris 1996) and his description of how research is funded is problema-
tized (e.g. Gray 1996). More importantly, his views about the nature and mission of edu-
cational research are criticized by many as being too narrow and instrumental but also too 
optimistic regarding what research can provide (e.g. Biesta 2007, Elliott 2003). Most im-
portantly for my purposes in this paper, his (implied) views about the teaching profession 
are also criticized, generally by the same people who criticize his views on educational 
research. It is in the context of the profession that we find the issue which I am going to 
concentrate on, namely professional judgment. As we shall see, some of the EBP critics 
worry that EBP means a more or less complete displacement of professional judgment 
and argue that we for that reason (plus other additional reasons) should reject EBP alto-
gether. And just for the record, it is of course possible to voice criticism of EBP without 
referring to David Hargreaves. For example, Bronwyn Davies (2003) largely sees EBP as 
being part of a managerial agenda to remove power from practitioners to bureaucrats.  
We can see from this brief sketch that in education the EBP debate branches off in sever-
al different directions. It is not obvious that all writers share the same definition of EBP, 
and it may well be that EBP gets an unfair proportion of criticism simply by being part of 
what I above called the current educational landscape. In the next section I shall expand 
on a small selection of these criticisms; thus leaving many interesting issues untouched. I 
shall argue that there are misunderstandings and confusions here which can be unraveled 
if we use Toulmin’s model of argumentation—EBP may be innocent of some of the 
charges directed against it. 
3. USING TOULMIN’S MODEL AS A LENS 
It is noteworthy that Hargreaves does not really discuss the question of how research evi-
dence is to be used in practice or in practitioners’ deliberations over what to do in their 
practice. In fact, this question seems to be largely missing from the debate – there are 
hints and suggestions, but to the best of my knowledge no in-depth inquiries. In his TTA 
lecture Hargreaves approvingly describes evidence-based medicine (EBM) as often hav-
ing a direct relevance to improvement of practice, and laments the view which says that 
research only has an indirect influence on policy and practice. He does not entirely agree 
with himself, though; other times he says that evidence should inform practice. However 
that may be, research should provide evidence of what works in what circumstances. By 
what works is meant the achievement of intended effects and/or the solving of problems 
(Sanderson 2003). 
 I shall look into some related but separable issues concerning the uses of evi-
dence in practical deliberations. Before I embark upon my analysis I shall present the 
essentials of Toulmin’s argument model, adding more details as they become necessary 
in the course of my discussion (Toulmin 1958/2003). He begins by distinguishing be-
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tween the claim or conclusion (C) that we are seeking to establish and the facts we appeal 
to as a foundation for C, called grounds or data (D) (p.90). The question “How did you 
get there” draws attention to the step from D to C and how this step can be justified or 
bridged. Propositions that provide the justification for inferring C from D he terms war-
rants (W) (p.91). The warrant seems to me to be of great importance, yet sadly neglected 
in educational reasoning. It authorizes the sort of step we make, licenses the inference, as 
David Hitchcock puts it (Hitchcock 2003). Toulmin himself raises the question of how 
absolute the distinction is between data and warrants, since the same sentence may in 
some contexts convey information and in other contexts authorize an inferential step. In 
any case, he says, the task of the warrant is to “register explicitly the legitimacy of the 
step involved” (p.92). Warrants confer different degrees of strength on the claims that 
they justify; hence, we may need to use a qualifier (Q) to express this, e.g. necessarily, 
presumably, possibly. Rebuttals (R), linguistically expressed as e.g. “unless”, refer to 
exceptional circumstances which undermine the general authority of the warrant. Both Q 
and R have a bearing on W; they comment on it, as Toulmin calls it. Next, we come to 
the question which is going to be central to my concerns; namely whether the warrant is 
acceptable at all. Suppose you insist that some C follows from data D, and somebody 
asks ‘but why do you think that?’ This is where the backing (B) of the warrant comes in: 
“Standing behind our warrants, […], there will normally be other assurances, without 
which the warrants themselves would possess neither authority nor currency”, Toulmin 
says (2003: 96). Following the lead of Milos Jenicek and David Hitchcock (2005), I shall 
argue that the concept of backing has the potential to clear up some of the fundamental 
misunderstandings about the functions of evidence in EBP.  
3.1 “Based”: evidence as data or grounds 
First a brief note on evidence. The questions of who, why and what constitutes evidence 
are much discussed by both critics and advocates of EBP. The more basic questions of 
what evidence is and what the nature of the relationship between evidence and the claim 
is, are usually not addressed. The established philosophical understanding sees evidence 
as something that supports a claim (belief, theory) or speaks to its truth value (e.g. 
Achinstein 2001). In the educational EBP context, evidence is thought to speak to the 
effectiveness of a strategy or a method of teaching.  
 But how, precisely, is evidence to be used by practitioners? I shall begin by 
looking into the question of what it might mean for practice to be based on evidence. It is 
not obvious that “based” is captured by the standard meaning of evidence, summed up in 
the term support. In the EBP debate, a literal understanding of it seems to be taken for 
granted. Bronwyn Davies (2003) is a case in point. She thinks of “based” in terms of a 
base or foundation consisting of facts and/or (quantitative) data. I think she voices what a 
good many writers on EBP, critics and adherents alike, take “based” to mean but do not 
say explicitly: a foundation of data that will tell you what to do in practice. Davies herself 
is primarily interested in issues of power, and so focuses on the who question: who se-
lects the evidence, who decides what is relevant, who defines what is effective and what 
counts as a success.  
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 I think we can identify a general tendency to understand the evidence–practice 
relationship as one of derivation: practice could and should be derived from a foundation of 
evidence. The idea is that if you derive a practice, it is pretty clear what you ought to do. 
 Teachers, like other practitioners, have to make many decisions about courses of 
action. I have poor readers in my class – what should I do? My students lack motivation 
to learn history – what should I do? I grant that the examples might be simplistic, but the 
chains of reasoning that lead up to the decisions surely are not. I think that both critics 
and advocates of EBP conceive of the relation between evidence and practice as parallel 
to the relation between data and claim. Suppose a teacher who is concerned with the read-
ing skills of his students makes any of the following claims: “I shall try Bowyer-Crane’s 
method for improving phonological measures” or “I shall ask my colleague what she did” 
or “I shall give them the same exercises that worked so well last year”. Even an (overly) 
simple example like this can trigger considerations that seem to be missing from the de-
bate. First, C may not be immediately obvious, and we may want to ask the teacher where 
it comes from; that is, what the basis for the claim is. The teacher may then say that he 
has poor readers in his class, a statement that serves as data D. I think much reasoning 
about what one should do in practice is set off by perceptions or felt problems such as 
this. But we do meet here with some problems. First, at the outset more than one C may 
be inferred from the same data. Second, it is not obvious that this is the kind of data that 
would pass for evidence in EBP – it is certainly not what Hargreaves has in mind. Third, 
the implied relation here is tricky ground. Many philosophers think that the relation of a 
claim to its putative evidence is one of support, not foundation (e.g. Achinstein 2001, 
Phillips 2007). Phillips states explicitly that facts (evidence) cannot be regarded as a base 
from which theory, policy or practice can be inferred. Yet he concedes that we in some 
sense might say that data generate hypotheses, but only in an indirect way as a source of 
puzzlement. Whatever the (somewhat uneasy) relationship between foundation and sup-
port, the following is important to note: In some sense or other, data D comprise evidence 
of sorts, and they do provide the basis for C, in the sense that C is at least generated from 
it if not downright derived from it.   
 There are no detailed discussions in the educational EBP literature of what role 
one thinks that research evidence should play for practice. Quite naturally the term evi-
dence-based practice makes people think of evidence as something on which practice 
should be based. That is to say, evidence plays the role of data or grounds (D) from 
which practice should be derived. Adherents presumably think this is a good idea, critics 
think it is a bad idea. Let us look at the critics first. 
 In a response to Hargreaves’ TTA lecture Martyn Hammersley (1997) throws 
doubt on the idea that teaching can be based on research knowledge. There are two main 
reasons for this. The first is that he thinks that the kinds of problems teachers face are not 
open to research, since only “technical” problems are thus open (there is no explanation 
of what “technical” means). The second reason is that since teaching is practical rather 
than technical, “[…] it is a matter of making judgements rather than following rules” 
(1997: 147, my emphasis). In a similar vein, Gert Biesta (2007: 11) describes advocates 
of EBP (at least the most extreme of them) as “[…] those who think that research will be 
able to give us ‘the truth’, that ‘the truth’ can be translated into rules for action, and that 
the only thing practitioners need to do is to follow these rules without any further reflec-
tion on or consideration of the concrete situation they are in”. This is telling, I think. It is 
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not clear where the idea comes from that EBP amounts to unreflective rule-following, but 
their views clearly indicate that the “evidence” in question serves as the grounds from 
which you derive your practice. It aggravates things if the evidence emanates from RCTs, 
since such evidence is general and thus forces the teacher to treat every student alike. 
Both Hammersley and Biesta conclude that EBP must be rejected.  
 Interestingly, David Hargreaves seems to ascribe much the same role to evi-
dence: data (D) from which practice (C) is derived. This evidence should tell us what 
works in what circumstances. He does not elaborate on how exactly evidence is to do its 
job for practice, but argues in several places that the impact should be direct. His critics, 
e.g. Hammersley, take him to mean that research should tell practitioners which is the best 
technique for dealing with a particular kind of problem. That is, evidence provides the data 
from which you derive your practice. This is no mindless rule-following, though, he many 
times underscores that evidence should enhance professional judgment, not replace it. Nev-
ertheless, it may be that Bridges, Smeyers and Smith have Hargreaves among others in 
mind when they describe EBP (the P standing in this case for ‘policy’) as follows: 
The evidence-based policy movement seems almost to presuppose an algorithm which will 
generate policy decisions: If A is what you want to achieve and if research shows R1, R2 and 
R3 to be the case, and if furthermore research shows that doing P is positively correlated with 
A, then it follows that P is what you need to do. So provided you have your education-
al/political goals sorted out, all you need to do is slot in the appropriate research findings – 
the right information – to extract your policy (2008: 9). 
We see here that while this type of consideration also casts evidence in the role of D (you 
extract your policy from it), it has also explicitly brought in a goal. This too is tricky 
ground in the EBP debate. For the moment, suffice it to say that bringing a normative entity 
into the picture does not seem to make difficulties for the employment of Toulmin’s model. 
The goal could be included in the grounds from which you infer your conclusion as to what 
you should do. Regretfully I have to leave this issue untreated in this paper. 
3.2 Evidence as backing  
It is not difficult to agree with the EBP critics that RCT evidence cannot be translated 
into rules for action and unreflectively implemented in practice. The literal understanding 
of “based” that takes evidence to have the function of data/grounds D in the Toulmin 
model clearly does not work – especially if the evidence in question is of the RCT kind.  
Before I inquire into a different role for evidence, let me bring up again the example of 
the poor readers. What can we do when faced with a proposed claim and proposed data? 
To begin with, we might look closely at the descriptions of both C and D. As Jenicek and 
Hitchcock (2005: 41) point out; there is no gold standard for the correctness (or effec-
tiveness) of C. C should therefore be justified by the best obtainable evidence. That 
means that we have to look closely at the description of D, and in our hypothetical case 
we might find it to be too vague. Just how poor readers are these students? Poor in what 
way? With some suitable description of D we are in a position to look at possible war-
rants. That is, we could ask our teacher how he got from D to C. In our hypothetical ex-
ample it might look something like this:  
 My students read poorly (D), so I shall ask my colleague what she did (C) since 
she is an experienced teacher (W). Alternatively: D, so I shall give them the same exer-
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cises that worked so well last year (C) since these students have the same problems, the 
same strategy should work (W). Alternatively: D, so I shall use Bowyer-Crane’s method 
to improve the phonological measures (C) since these particular reading problems are 
helped with better phonological measures (W). 
 The warrant is the justification for inferring C from D. It seems to me that the 
concept of a warrant is of great importance in educational reasoning, to draw attention to 
the relation between teachers’ decisions of what to do and the grounds their decisions are 
based on and to make this relation explicit. Often the warrant is left unstated, but in situa-
tions where people are asked to justify their actions or decisions the warrant is a good 
place to start. But what is a warrant? Toulmin requires that warrants be general, certifying 
the soundness of all arguments of the appropriate type. Warrants are not data; they are 
rules that basically say “data such as D entitle one to draw conclusions, or make claims, 
such as C” (Toulmin 2003: 91). David Hitchcock (2003) describes warrants as inference-
licenses; that is, general rules which we reason in accordance with to authorize the step 
from D to C. Importantly, he points out that the question of how you get from D to C can 
have a variety of answers. In my example the warrants naturally vary because they li-
cense the inference to different Cs, but one can easily imagine that the warrant from the 
same D to the same C can differ.  
 A warrant is thus not evidence in itself and must be established in a different 
way than the facts we invoke as data (p.92). Obviously, not just any proposed warrant 
should be accepted as having authority; we might reasonably question the legitimacy of 
warrants if they strike us as somehow not up to standard. For example, we may ask why 
one should think that the same strategy will work with different students, or why certain 
phonological skills can remedy a reading problem. Warrants above all need to be reliable, 
and thus it is that Toulmin introduces the concept of backing; as that which justifies our 
warrants and provides them with the authority they need to license the step from D to C.  
It is as backing that I think we can find a good place for research evidence in EBP, even RCT 
evidence. This is a different function for evidence; one that does not allow you derive deci-
sions about what to do directly from the evidence, but one that helps you justify your deci-
sion. As a bonus, it provides a sensible answer to the much-discussed question of what it 
means for research evidence to inform practice. It suggests a more indirect role for evidence, 
which seems to be what many EBP writers want but clearly find hard to conceptualize.  
 Let us look at a (constructed) example of reasoning to get to a conclusion about 
what to do. Suppose you are teaching first-graders to read, and toward the end of the year 
you observe that some of them are reading-delayed. This observation is your data, D. So, 
you infer, these children should receive extra word and text training, C. When a colleague 
asks how you came to this decision, you may answer that this is a well-tried remedy to 
help reading-delayed children (W). If your colleague is not satisfied with this warrant, he 
may ask you why you think this remedy helps. In Toulminian terms, he is asking you to 
justify your warrant, to give it the authority it needs to license the inference from D to C. 
He is asking for backing of the warrant. And here research evidence comes into the pic-
ture. You may, for example, refer to a randomized controlled trial indicating that com-
pared with the control group, children who received this intervention for two consecutive 
10-week periods, made significant progress on measure of letter knowledge, single word 
reading and phoneme awareness (B). This study concludes that a reading intervention 
program systematically delivered over a period of time is an effective intervention for 
TONE KVERNBEKK 
8 
children who show reading delays at the end of their first school year (Hatcher et.al. 
2006). It supports your warrant and indirectly your decision. 
 Some observations are in order. First, we may see a goal as being implicitly pre-
sent, for example the goal of teaching all children to read well. Second, when research 
evidence serves the function of backing, it occupies a more indirect role in reasoning to-
ward a decision of what to do. It certainly does not function as truths which we can trans-
late directly into rules for action. It rather functions in accordance with what I above took 
to be the common philosophical understanding, namely as support for the warrant. But 
the distinctions may be very fine here, since “evidence” can be used in both capacities, 
both as D and B. I have treated D rather step motherly in my example, and no doubt the 
data comprising D can come in many different shapes, from observations in practice to 
test scores indicating that children may have low phoneme awareness. Or perhaps it is 
better to say that test scores serve to justify D? As Jenicek and Hitchcock point out: 
The grounds [data D] are the underlying evidence that supports this claim, that is, the results. 
The argument is evidence-based in the sense that the claim rests on systematically obtained 
observations (Jenicek & Hitchcock 2005: 165). 
That is to say, D should be justified. This means that evidence, including quantitative 
research evidence, can also in some cases perform the function of D, or at least can be 
used to justify D, to provide a more precise description of the problem and thus improve 
the adequacy of C. Nevertheless, it seems sensible to me that in the practical reasoning 
that we are talking about here, the data that provides the starting point are more likely to 
be an observation of a problem or a situation that requires some form of action on part of 
the practitioner. The important thing to keep in mind is that D and B answer different 
questions, perform different functions. 
 Third, there is the question of qualifiers and rebuttals or conditions of exception. 
They both speak to the bearing of W on the inference from D to C, that is, to the applicabil-
ity of W. “[…] qualifiers (Q) indicating the strength conferred by the warrant on this [i.e. 
the D–C step], conditions of rebuttal (R) indicating circumstances in which the general 
authority of the warrant would have to be set aside”, Toulmin explains (2003: 94). Har-
greaves (1996a), it will be recalled, wants research evidence that demonstrates conclusively 
that strategy y yields better results than strategy x. This, I take it, amounts to his wanting a 
universal warrant with an absolute backing, allowing no exceptions at all. Later (1997) he 
(albeit apparently unwillingly) softens this view somewhat and deals in probabilities instead. 
 Hatcher et.al. (2006) on the other hand, state explicitly that there are exceptions; 
25% of the children did not respond to the intervention. They also provide a description 
of the predictors that characterize the non-responders and suggest that these account for 
the non-responsiveness to the intervention (p.825). If we use Hatcher’s quantitative data 
as backing, we cannot take “this is a well-tried remedy” to be a universal warrant, but for 
the sake of this argument we can take it to be a general warrant and accept it as lending 
authority to our warrant and to our decision. Thus, we would have to expand our practical 
reasoning: based on observations of reading delays (D), you infer that unless the children 
have extremely low scores on word recognition and letter knowledge (R), they will pre-
sumably (Q) respond well to extra word and text training (C), since this is a well-tried rem-
edy for reading-delayed children (W); the warrant being backed by sound evidence (B).  
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 Fourth, it is simply assumed here that the research evidence is sound. But to ap-
peal to (empirical) evidence might give an aura of scientific support that is misleading, 
perhaps even unfounded, if the quality of the evidence is poor. It is also the case in educa-
tional research that conclusions tend to be contradicted in other studies; that is, in a good 
many studies there is both positive and negative evidence. In such cases it is an open 
question whether the warrant can be said to carry any authority at all. Decision makers 
(and others) may be very selective in their appeal to evidence to support or justify their 
views or decisions – proponents of virtually any debate can thus maintain that the “evi-
dence” supports their views. It may also be the case that competing decisions C, inferred 
from the same data, are equally well justified with a warrant backed by sound research 
evidence. There are, for example, other forms of intervention to remedy poor, slow or 
delayed reading; such as programs focusing on letter-sound knowledge and phonological 
awareness, and on vocabulary, inference generation and narrative skills (Bowyer-Crane 
et.al. 2008). Conditions of exception are reported for both programs, to the extent that it 
would be problematic to say that either of them confers authority on a warrant (p.422); a 
general warrant is not applicable. In use of research evidence it is vital to map, as best 
one can, the conditions of exception. 
3.3 Evidence replaces professional judgment? 
Hopefully the above illustrates the difference between using evidence as data (D) and 
backing (B). Advocates and critics of EBP alike seem to quite naturally cast evidence in 
the role of data, such that practice can be directly derived from this assumed foundation 
of facts and statistics. Employing Toulmin’s model I have argued above that it makes 
more sense to cast evidence in an indirect role as backing of warrant, although I do not 
wish to lose sight of the potential role of evidence in justifying D. Evidence as backing 
makes the reasoning toward a decision of what to do more longwinded, but it has the ad-
ditional virtue of forcing the practitioner to pay attention to possible exceptions. 
 Unlike critics such as Gert Biesta (2007), John Elliott (2001), Martyn Hammers-
ley (1997) and Ian Sanderson (2003) I am not afraid that research evidence will replace 
professional judgment. To accord evidence the function of backing, is rather to show how 
it can enter into and be part of professional judgment. To the best of my knowledge, no 
EBP adherent has ever argued that research evidence should replace professional judg-
ment; Hargreaves himself explicitly states that evidence should enhance judgment, not 
replace it – although he does not say how. 
 The issue of general versus context-bound knowledge is frequently discussed in 
education, and also in the context of EBP. Again critics and advocates largely agree that 
EBP mainly deals in generalized evidence, but again they disagree about the value of 
generality. Hargreaves thinks it is a good thing and therefore welcomes RCT; Elliott 
thinks it is a bad thing and recommends case studies instead (2001: 564). Most critics opt 
for context-bound evidence, because judgments are deeply context-dependent.  
 General knowledge of course is problematic if one thinks that EBP entails that 
practitioners are reduced to following general rules of action with no opportunity to adapt 
the knowledge to the concrete circumstances. It is hard to see precisely what the EBP 
critics take a professional judgment to be and what sort of considerations they see as en-
tering into such judgments. They are context-dependent, so must clearly make use of con-
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textual data, but which data, and how? Some critics also argue that EBP should be reject-
ed because the generalized knowledge (evidence) in question exclusively speaks to the 
effectiveness of a given strategy, not only ignoring but precluding questions of ethics or 
appropriateness (e.g. Sanderson 2003). What works is not what matters, Sanderson ar-
gues, but what is appropriate. And here is the other element in professional judgments: 
they seem to be intimately associated with ethical concerns, not instrumental ones. But 
then again, it is hard to see why these should be seen as mutually exclusive. Elliott attrib-
utes to Hargreaves the view that generalizations can be continually improved upon, thus 
moving in the direction of universal statements which in turn entail a progressive diminu-
tion of unpredictability in human affairs. This is an interesting observation and quite pos-
sibly true of Hargreaves’ wishes for EBP, but not necessarily true of EBP.    
 Does EBP imply a diminution of unpredictability in learning, such that the prob-
ability of attaining the predetermined goals is maximized, bordering on certainty? Many 
educationists are highly suspicious of generalized solutions to educational problems. This 
worry points to characteristics of the educational field itself: its (practical) problems are 
diverse, unstable, unpredictable and occur in messy, particular contexts (Bridges, Smey-
ers & Smith 2008). While I by and large agree with this description, it does not follow 
that practitioners cannot avail themselves of generalized knowledge or even of RCT evi-
dence. As Jenicek and Hitchcock (2005) point out, uncertainty in a field does not speak 
against EBP; what happens is rather that the warrant for the D–C inference is merely pro-
visional or presumptive. 
 All human affairs, including education, can be said to include some measure of 
uncertainty, some degree of randomness. It may be true that the educational climate today 
incorporates a wish for teaching methods to guarantee that the predetermined learning 
outcomes are attained, and EBP is part of this climate. But, thankfully, EBP cannot guar-
antee learning outcomes, nor should it be expected to. Hargreaves may want conclusive 
evidence, but the world of education is simply not like that. But neither is it completely 
chaotic and unpredictable and all educational problems are not unique. 
 The critics of EBP are surely right that professional judgment in education, prac-
tical reasoning, does not consist in the unreflective following of rules directly derived 
from general research evidence. Rather it consists in reasoning to a decision about a par-
ticular course of action in a concrete situation characterized by uncertainty and many un-
known (and presumably ungovernable) factors. The pathway of reasoning that emerges 
from Toulmin’s model and that is developed by Jenicek and Hitchcock, is one that begins 
from particular concerns, proceeds in various steps from D to C, the step authorized by a 
warrant which should be backed by generalized (or other) evidence, via a check on condi-
tions of exceptions which may render the warrant inapplicable, and back to a decision 
about what to do in the concrete case. There is no reason why practical reasoning should 
leave out ethical concerns—one can know of an effective method and refrain from using 
it on ethical grounds. Evidently professional judgments are highly complex and there are 
many pitfalls along the way, such as ignoring the importance of making explicit and 
checking the warrant that licenses the inference from data to claim/decision. I would like 
again to draw attention to the pitfall of ignoring possible conditions of exception; I have a 
feeling this element in educational reasoning is sadly neglected. But one may “misdiag-
nose” the poor readers, their behavior may be misinterpreted, or their “diagnostic” test 
results may for various reasons be misleading (one can note here the temptation to call for 
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more testing of children). If a child is an exception, for example suffers from severe dyslexia, 
the proposed remedy might have no effect on him. But even if the problems of the children 
were accurately described, one has no guarantee that the preferred course of action will yield 
the desired result. There might in principle be other factors that influence the situation and 
that are not within the teacher’s control. Some element of unpredictability remains.  
4. CONCLUSION 
There are several different elements that are discussed under the EBP heading, and I have 
in this paper focused on one: the possible functions of research evidence in practical rea-
soning – or professional judgment, as educationists tend to call it. I have chosen to use 
RCT evidence as my example, since this is particularly contested.  
 I have argued that both adherents to and critics of EBP seem to hold the same 
view of the role that research evidence is to play in EBP, namely as a foundation, consist-
ing of facts, data and evidence about what works, from which practice could and should 
be derived. It may be that this understanding is brought on by a literal interpretation of 
the meaning of “based”. For the adherents this is a good thing, since it presumably will 
make education much more effective in attaining its goals. While this view may be a bit 
caricatured, it does capture the optimism expressed by advocates of EBP. The critics, 
who far outnumber the adherents (at least if you do not count politicians and bureaucrats), 
understand the function of evidence in the same way, but see it as a bad thing. Some in-
terpret it as implying that EBP reduces practice to mere unreflective rule-following; the 
evidence decides what you should do. Others problematize the usefulness of general 
knowledge for professional judgments that are inevitably context-bound, and still others 
see effectiveness as precluding ethical concerns. 
 Using Toulmin’s model of the lay-out of an argument, inspired by Jenicek and 
Hitchcock, I have argued that it makes more sense to view research evidence as backing 
of the warrant. The direct impact if research evidence is intimately linked, both by adher-
ents and critics, to an understanding of evidence as data or grounds. The critics are right 
that generalized evidence cannot tell you directly what to do with your students. As back-
ing, evidence gets an indirect role in complex reasoning toward a decision. It is not 
enough just to possess evidence of how things are or of how they work; one must also be 
able to use it. There is plenty of room for sound professional judgments in deliberations 
concerning what to do and how to use available general knowledge and evidence. This is 
very far from being unreflective rule-following. There are good, bad, logical and illogical 
ways of using evidence; merely having it is not sufficient. 
 To use research evidence as backing of the warrant is to accord it an indirect role 
in professional judgment, and may be one way of explaining how research can inform prac-
tice. This might make EBP more acceptable to the critics, since many of them explicitly 
acknowledge that research should inform practice – they just do not tell us what that comes 
down to. Evidence as backing also leaves room for uncertainty, for the unpredictability of 
human affairs, and Toulmin’s model calls attention to the importance of investigating con-
ditions of exception which might make the warrant weak or inapplicable altogether.   
 EBP can thus be said to have received criticism it does not deserve. It does not entail 
unreflective rule-following. On the other hand, we must not let it get away with its part in the 
broad and highly troublesome instrumentalization of education that we see today. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Kvernbekk’s paper addresses what has become a contentious issue, namely, the 
desirability of evidence based practice (EBP) in education. She comments 
In education EBP largely seems to have arisen as a government wish for better research bases 
to inform policy and practice; this has become known as the what works agenda.  
She offers a brief overview of early proposals advocating EBP in education (in particular, 
those of David Hargreaves) and a sampling of the fairly widespread negative reaction to 
those proposals, noting that opposition to EBP is often connected with concerns about 
certain trends in contemporary education. Against this background, she situates what she 
attempts in her paper as follows: 
This criticism of the big picture of contemporary education is, to my mind, both pertinent and 
justified. But it cannot automatically be assumed that it thereby applies to EBP as well; EBP 
in itself is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce the educational landscape outlined 
above. When we single out EBP for special attention, two things stand out. First, the abun-
dance of misunderstandings and confusions concerning the term evidence; and second, the 
absence of fruitful discussions about the possible uses or roles of research evidence in prac-
tice. In this paper I shall discuss the second issue, focusing on how research evidence can en-
ter into practitioners’ deliberations and decisions—not on what teachers might do in their 
classrooms. [Underling added.] 
The result is, in my estimation, an admirably balanced and illuminating account of the 
role that research evidence—and in particular evidence gathered using randomized con-
trolled trials (RCT)—might play in the deliberations and decisions of classroom teachers. 
2. THE CORE OF KVERNBEKK’S PROPOSAL 
Professor Kvernbekk proposes that we view the deliberations teachers must engage in—
the reasoning through which they arrive at their “professional judgments”—through the 
lens of Toulmin’s model of argument. If we do that, she suggests, we can begin to view 
the principal role of research evidence not as ”data” on which “claims” or conclusions 
about what to do in the classroom are “based,” but rather as backing which can validate 
some of the warrants which license the move from data to claim. I assume that members 
of this audience are familiar enough with the Toulmin model to understand the implica-
tions of Professor Kvernbekk’s suggestion on this point and can appreciate the light that 
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this suggestion throws on the role that research results can play in the deliberations of 
practitioners. What I’d like to underscore are three of the four very important “observa-
tions” she offers in section 3.2 of the paper. 
(1) Her first observation is that “we may see a goal as being implicitly present, for 
example the goal of teaching all children to read well.” I personally would want 
to add that a variety of goals may be relevant to the decision to be made, a fact 
that may complicate decisions because a course of action which satisfies one 
goal may frustrate the satisfaction of another. In this respect it’s worth recalling 
that Toulmin himself (203, p. 109), commenting on proposed “universal war-
rants” in the context of reasoning about ethical matters, says that they “can au-
thorize only presumptive conclusions.”1  
(2) Kvernbekk’s third observation concerns the “qualifiers and rebuttals or condi-
tions of exception” which “speak to the bearing of W on the inference from D to 
C”.  Where a rebuttal or “condition of exception” obtains, a warrant W is simply 
not applicable. And where qualifiers such as “probably” or “presumptively” are 
required, they can have considerable bearing on our decisions, especially when 
conflicting goals complicate the decisions that have to be made. 
(3) Her fourth and final observation is that “appeal to (empirical) evidence might 
give an aura of scientific support that is misleading, perhaps even unfounded. 
For one thing, the quality of the evidence is poor.” For another, “in educational 
research … conclusions tend to be contradicted in other studies; that is, in a good 
many studies there is both positive and negative evidence. In such cases it is an 
open question whether the warrant can be said to carry any authority at all.” 
These observations help to spell out the constraints that quite naturally impose them-
selves on any sensible reliance on research evidence in the context of educational deci-
sion-making.  
3. CONCLUSION  
Professor Kvernbekk has focused on “on how research evidence can enter into practition-
ers’ deliberations and decisions,” and has identified two ways in which such evidence can 
have a bearing on those deliberations:  
 Most interestingly, “research evidence” can function as backing for many of the 
warrants on which the practitioners rely in moving from “data” to a “claim” or 
conclusion. 
 In addition, since the “data”  themselves must be justified., “[t]his means that ev-
idence, including quantitative research evidence, can also in some cases perform 
                                                 
1
  The recognition that a variety of goals can be relevant to educational decisions which may draw in some 
way on empirical research goes a long way to meet Sanderson’s concern (as reported in Biestra [2007: 
10]) that the “what works agenda” precludes recognizing the ethical and “normative” of problem-
solving. It also addresses Biestra’s own concerns (2007: 20 ) about a “democratic deficit in evidence-
based education.” 
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the function of D, or at least can be used to justify D, to provide a more precise de-
scription of the problem and thus improve the adequacy of C” (section 3.2). 
If the bearing of research evidence on the decisions that practitioners must make is con-
ceived along these lines, there should be no temptation to think that such evidence will 
“dictate” what practitioners must do or will obviate the need for “professional judgment.” 
Nor will taking account of research evidence in the course of such deliberations require 
practitioners to ignore all other considerations and give in to a mindless pre-occupation 
with “what works.” At the same time, it is clear that such evidence can make useful and 
important contributions to such decisions. In my estimation, these are important points, 
and Professor Kvernbekk is quite right about them.  
 Reflecting on what she has said in this paper, I can see three areas for further 
study that the view developed here invites. 
(1) The deliberations in which a practitioner engages in order to arrive at a thought-
ful decision about what to do can be fairly complex. They will often, if not typi-
cally, involve bringing several different goals to bear on the problem at hand and 
require the practitioner to weigh the relative importance of those different goals 
on possible solutions to the problem which has prompted the deliberations. Fur-
ther development of Kvernbekk’s ideas about the role of research evidence in 
the deliberations of practitioners should probably attempt to lay out in more de-
tail the role that goals can play within a Toulmin model of reasoning and delib-
eration, and should deal with the question of how, within the Toulmin model, 
pro and con considerations are to be “weighed.”2  
(2)  Professor Kvernbekk envisages the teaching practitioner as engaging in fairly 
sophisticated use of warrants—and perhaps making sophisticated judgments 
about the backing on which those warrants depend. Questions can be raised, in 
light of data on typical American and Canadian teacher education at the B.Ed. 
level, about whether current teacher education equips practitioners to make the 
judgments about warrants and about research evidence—in particular about RCT 
evidence—required by the sort of deliberation envisaged here. It might, for ex-
ample, turn out to be the case that reform of teacher education might be a pre-
requisite for effective use of such evidence in the deliberations of “practition-
ers.” Alternately, universities may need to play a larger (and perhaps more for-
mal) role in “knowledge mobilization” to communicate and interpret research 
for such purposes.
3
 This is an issue that needs to be addressed in a fuller elabora-
tion of the view presented here. 
                                                 
2
  Though Toulmin, as indicated above, acknowledges that some warrants authorize only presumptive 
acceptance, and also makes explicit provision for exceptions and ‘rebuttals” which render a warrant in-
applicable, he has little to say about how to handle situations in which two “presumptive” conclusions 
are at odds with each other. 
3
  This idea is developed in Cooper, Levin and Campbell (2009): see their claim that “Most people, in-
cluding most professionals, get their knowledge of research not from reading the original studies, but 
through various mediating processes” (p. 162). They also report that “studies contend that changing 
practice is often a result of the interactions of informal teacher networks” (p. 166).  
ROBERT C PINTO 
4 
(3) This paper focuses on the role of “research evidence” in the deliberations of 
teaching practitioners. I suspect that there are interesting and important ques-
tions to be raised about its role in the deliberations of educational administrators 
and of the government agencies which set the constraints under which educa-
tional administrators must work. The deliberations of teaching practitioners typi-
cally focus on what to do in specific, concrete situations with particular groups 
of students. The deliberations of administrators and government agencies are 
much more likely to focus on decisions about policies which are intended to ap-
ply “across the board,” as it were.4 As a result, the role of research evidence in 
the deliberations of administrators and politicians will very likely have to be dif-
ferent from its role in the deliberations of practitioners.  
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  See for example the discussion of the development educational policy in the curriculum reform under-
taken in Ontario in the 1990s in L. E. Pinto (forthcoming)  
